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management. Then, through the multiple 
case study, we investigate the attitude 
of seven Serbian corporations toward 
defining the general corporate objective, 
corporate governance, and performance 
measurement. Finally, we point out the 
factors and preconditions that determine 
corporate culture, objective definition, and 
performance measures used by Serbian 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Companies face the different and often conflicting demands of a number of 
stakeholders. This problem is particularly evident when defining the primary 
objective of a company’s business. Although companies often define their general 
business objectives as profit maximization, growth and development, and 
market share increase, none of these is sufficiently comprehensive to ensure that 
the requirements of all stakeholders are met. Some authors (Rappaport, 2006; 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000) suggest that the majority of modern companies, 
as a general objective (mission) of their businesses, identify shareholder value 
maximization, usually defined as the present value of future free cash flows. 
Shareholder value maximization is considered to be a sufficiently comprehensive 
objective to ensure the satisfaction of the requirements of most stakeholders 
(Stančić, 2006; Jensen, 2001), and is a cornerstone of the value-based management 
(VBM) approach.
At the base of all value creation models are several key value drivers that determine 
the amount and the present value of expected cash flows. These key value drivers 
are return on invested capital (ROIC), weighted average cost of capital (WACC), 
expected company growth rate, and competitive advantage period (the period 
during which the company expects to generate a difference between the return 
on invested capital and the weighted average cost of capital). The value is created 
when a company succeeds in achieving a positive performance spread, i.e., when 
ROIC exceeds WACC. Negative performance spread is a reliable sign that current 
business activity is destroying the value of a company. The amount of value 
created or destroyed is the product of invested capital and performance spread.
Moskalev and Park (2010) suggest that the corporation must be built on the 
core concept of value, and that the firm’s organization, strategy, processes, 
communication, everything the firm does, must be consistently aligned with the 
key value drivers. They further suggest that if VBM is successfully implemented, 
then corporate culture will support and encourage corporate governance 
mechanisms consistent with value creation at all levels within the organization. 
The link between corporate governance and corporate valuation has been 
investigated in several studies (Dahya et al., 2008; Durnev and Kim, 2005). 
These studies show that strong governance can protect the interests of minority 
shareholders and improve company performance, even more in countries with 
weak than in countries with strong legal protection of investors. VALUE-BASED MANAGEMENt IN SERBIAN CORPORAtIONS
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This paper aims to investigate characteristics of internal governance mechanisms 
in the context of value-based management and the specific economic and cultural 
conditions within which corporations in Serbia operate. We conduct the analysis 
using a multiple case method on a sample of seven corporations in Serbia. We 
build our analysis on several previous papers that use the multiple case method to 
investigate similar corporate problems. We expect that our research will provide 
an insight into the corporate culture, corporate objectives, and performance 
measures used in the large publicly traded companies from different industry 
sectors in Serbia. This insight is the basis for understanding the factors influencing 
the corporate culture and governance of Serbian companies, and for the future 
theoretical and empirical investigation of this problem.
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Value-based management (VBM) can be defined as a framework for targeting 
those business decisions that consistently add economic value to a company (Morin 
and Jarrell, 2001). It is also a managerial approach in which company objectives, 
systems, strategies, processes, performance measurements, and culture have as 
their guiding objective shareholder value maximization. The simple concepts 
behind VBM are value and value creation. The value of a company is determined 
by its discounted future cash flows, and value is created when a company invests 
capital at returns that exceed the cost of that capital. Copeland et al. (1994) point 
out that VBM extends these concepts by focusing on how companies use them to 
make strategic and operating decisions. 
Copeland et al. (1994) also suggest that VBM focuses on better decision making 
at all levels in an organization, and calls on managers to use value-based 
performance measures for making better decisions. Similarly, todorović (2010) 
points out that value-based performance measures are particularly useful because 
they show managers how they can create value, while Kaličanin (2005) points 
out that these measures provide the motivation for managers in the selection 
and implementation of those options that maximize value. However, managers 
still often use measures based on accounting data (according to Fitzgerald, 2007). 
Although this approach is obviously simpler, it results in only partially accurate 
indications and suboptimal decisions, since accounting data weakly correspond 
with factors determining shareholder value (Čupić, 2011; Rappaport, 2006; 
Stewart 2003). This is confirmed in many empirical studies showing that value 
measures are more significantly related to shareholder returns than accounting 
measures (e.g., Wet and toit, 2007; Wortington and West, 2004; O’Byrne, 1996).96
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Although the original idea behind VBM was to align the measurement system 
with value creation in a way that accounting measurement systems did not, 
some authors suggest that too much focus on performance measurement caused 
serious problems in VBM implementation. For example, Koller et al. (2005) argue 
that many VBM programmes failed because companies developed objective and 
comprehensive value-based measurement systems, but neglected management 
processes and corporate governance. Morin and Jarrell (2001) argue that investing 
in relationships with shareholders and other stakeholders can add value, while 
Rappaport (2005) believes that a company can better realize its potential for value 
creation by aligning the interests of shareholders and managers, and providing 
investors with value-relevant information. 
Some authors empirically investigate the importance of corporate governance 
for improving company performance. Dahya et al. (2008) and Durnev and Kim 
(2005) find that strong governance (primarily a strong board) can protect the 
interests of minority shareholders and improve company performance, and even 
more so in countries with weak than in countries with strong legal protection of 
investors. Coombes and Watson (2000) show that investors in the US and UK 
are willing to pay up to 18% more for shares of companies with good governance 
than for the shares of companies with similar performance but poor practice 
of corporate governance. Barton and Wong (2006) show that investors in 
developing countries are ready to pay from 20%-40% more for shares with good 
governance. Mitton (2002) finds that firms with higher disclosure quality, greater 
transparency, and higher outside ownership concentration experience better 
stock price performance during periods of crisis. 
The general model of corporate governance, aimed at resolving the agency problem 
that arises between the agent (manager) and the principal (shareholders), which is 
typical in economic systems with strong legal protection of investors where the roles 
of managers and owners are clearly divided (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), cannot 
be used as a starting point for investigating the relationship between corporate 
governance and company performance in developing economies. An insufficiently 
developed institutional context in developing economies makes the enforcement of 
agency contracts and protection of investors more costly and problematic (Wright 
et al., 2005). This results in the prevalence of concentrated firm ownership, which 
acts as the major governance mechanism in developing countries. Concentrated 
ownership, combined with an absence of effective protection of minority investors, 
results in more frequent conflicts between dominant (ultimate, controlling) 
shareholder and minority shareholders (Young et al., 2008; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997), with negative consequences for firm performance.VALUE-BASED MANAGEMENt IN SERBIAN CORPORAtIONS
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In developing countries with weak legal protection of investors, corporate 
governance is the means by which minority shareholders are protected from 
expropriation of their rights by managers and the dominant shareholder. 
Institutions that are important external governance mechanisms in developed 
countries, such as the stock exchange, securities regulators, institutional investors, 
and the judiciary, are weak in developing economies. A high quality of disclosure 
and strong boards of directors are, therefore, besides ownership concentration, 
the most important internal governance mechanisms in developing economies. 
Many authors stress the importance of internal governance mechanisms 
regardless of economy development. Morin and Jarrell (2001) pointed out that 
the three main areas of corporate governance are performance measurement, 
the compensation system, and investor communication, while Mitton (2002) 
put special emphasis on disclosure quality, ownership structure, and corporate 
diversification. La Porta et al. (1998) argue that accounting standards play a 
critical role in corporate governance by informing investors and by making 
contracts more verifiable. 
3. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
3.1. Context of the analysis
Serbia has a civil law legal system, and belongs to the group of emerging and 
developing countries. In many studies (e.g., Johnson et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 
2000) civil law countries have been linked with strong regulation but weak effective 
(institutional) protection of investors, particularly minority shareholders. In the 
case of Serbia this is confirmed in The World Bank global report Doing Business 
2011, which shows that Serbia ranks better in legal (measured by strength of 
investor protection index) than in effective judicial (measured by enforcing 
contracts index) protection of investors. Among 183 economies Serbia is ranked 
74th in protecting investors, and 94th in enforcing contracts. Kaličanin (2005) 
argues that Serbian corporations are not motivated to be transparent in business 
and do not feel pressure from shareholders to deliver the required returns or 
to create value for them. The shareholders are subjects of attention only if they 
are dominant (which is often); but then the problem of protecting minority 
shareholders arises. 
The process of transition, which caused changes in the institutional and economic 
system and in the ways companies operate and in which managers and staff behave, 
has motivated some Serbian companies to introduce technology and management 98
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systems recognized and used by the successful companies operating in developed 
market economies (Bogićević Milikić et al., 2008). For example, Bogićević Milikić 
and Janićijević (2009) show that performance evaluation systems (PES) have 
become an institutionally accepted way of operating in Serbian companies such 
as tarket, telekom Srbija, etc. Medicinal products manufacturer Hemofarm was 
one of the pioneers among Serbian corporations in using VBM methodologies. In 
the annual report for 2003 Hemofarm reports: “In the course of 2003 Hemofarm 
Group introduced innovative instruments of monitoring financial performance 
in cooperation with the structurally major shareholder Aktiva. The “Economic 
Value Added” concept became the key instrument for performance evaluation at 
the Strategic Business Unit levels”. 
3.2. Research methodology
The attitude of companies in Serbia toward value-based management, corporate 
governance, and performance measurement is relatively unknown. That is 
why we use the multiple case method, which is suited to researching unknown 
subjects (Bogićević Milikić and Janićijević, 2009), i.e., for getting in-depth 
and first-hand understanding of a particular situation (Yin, 2004). Yin (2004) 
defines the case study research method as an empirical inquiry that investigates 
a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, when the boundaries 
between the phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident, and in which 
multiple sources of evidence are used. Unlike single case studies, multiple case 
studies permit replication and extension between individual cases, which helps 
researchers to understand patterns more easily, to eliminate chance associations, 
and to form better theoretical structure (Eisenhardt, 1991).
The multiple case method has been used in several studies on corporate 
governance and performance measurement systems (Bogićević Milikić and 
Janićijević, 2009; Chen and Guliang, 2009; Kennerly and Neely, 2002). While 
there is no ideal number of cases, a number between four and ten usually works 
(Eisenhardt, 1989), so we design a seven-case study. We analyse seven large 
(according to Serbian Accounting and Audit Law, RS Official Gazette, Nos. 
46/2006 and 111/2009) publicly traded companies. As in Chen and Guliang 
(2009) and Kennerly and Neely (2002), companies from different industry sectors 
and with a wide variety of competitive and organizational characteristics were 
intentionally chosen to introduce diversity into the sample, and to enable the 
identification of factors affecting the evolution of measurement in a variety of 
different circumstances. We also chose companies from different Belgrade Stock 
Exchange (BSE) markets (regulated and unregulated) because we wanted to VALUE-BASED MANAGEMENt IN SERBIAN CORPORAtIONS
99
investigate if listing requirements had influenced the way companies behaved. 
General characteristics of the companies involved in the research are shown in 
table 1. 
The research took place during 2008, and the data was collected by referring to 
publicly available data (annual reports, Business Registers Agency, and company 
web sites), and through questionnaires and phone interviews with top managers 
and employees designated by the top manager. The questionnaire and interview 
were designed to get the answers to the following four questions: 
a) How does the company communicate with its shareholders?
b) How does the company define its general and additional objectives? 
c)  Is the company aware of the existence of the value-based management concept? 
Does the company use this concept, or try to implement it?
d) What performance measures does the company use?
This research is intended to provide an insight into the corporate culture, corporate 
objectives, and performance measures used in the large publicly traded companies 
from different industry sectors. This insight is the basis for understanding the 
factors influencing corporate culture and governance of Serbian companies, and 
for the future theoretical and empirical investigation of this issue.
Table 1.  Basic information on business cases
Company Industry
Total sales 
in 2008  
(000 €)
Total assets 
in 2008  
(000 €)
Belgrade stock 
exchange 
market
1
Production of non-electrical 
household appliances
35,515 40,537
Regulated 
market 
2
Production of rusks, biscuits, 
preserved pastry goods and cakes
64,547 72,125
Unregulated 
market
3
Production of soft drinks, mineral 
waters and other bottled waters
71,880 78,674
Unregulated 
market
4
Production of enamel, stainless steel 
and non-stick cookware
6,300 39,317
Regulated 
market 
5 Production of furniture 62,591 190,214
Unregulated 
market
6 
Production of footwear, technical 
rubber goods and chemical products
2,845 45,909
Regulated 
market 
7
Wholesaler of medications and 
medical products
129,913 298,761
Unregulated 
market
Source:  Belgrade Stock Exchange, Business Registers Agency and company web sites100
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3.3. Research findings
We first analyse the ownership and board structure of the companies in our 
study. table 2 shows that all the companies in our study have a controlling 
shareholder. Controlling shareholder is defined as a single owner of voting rights 
in a company, providing that it controls at least 10% of the company’s votes 
(Dahya et al., 2008; La Porta, 1998). The mean of equity holdings of the three 
largest shareholders is 56%, which is considerably more than in emerging (51%) 
and developed economies (41%), as reported by Young et al. (2008). 
The mean of board size is 8.43 directors, which is consistent with the 7-12 directors 
reported in several studies on boards of non-financial firms from developed 
and developing countries (Dahya et al., 2008; Andres et al., 2005). On average, 
independent directors account for 30.08% of directors on the board, which is 
considerably less than the average proportion of independent directors (around 
80%) reported for banks (Adams and Mehran, 2008; Andres and Vallelado, 2008), 
and the average proportion of independent directors (at least 38%) reported for 
non-financial firms (Dahya et al., 2008; Andres et al., 2005). 
The implication of these results is that the dominant shareholders of companies 
in Serbia tend to appoint weak boards, which can lead to serious conflicts between 
dominant and minority shareholders in the absence of developed external 
governance mechanisms. In addition, companies that are traded on the regulated 
markets of the BSE (1, 4 and 6) have a lower ownership concentration ratio, which 
could be due to the requirement for these companies to have at least 25% of shares 
in free float. These companies also tend to have smaller boards of directors and a 
lower proportion of independent directors on the board.
Table 2.  Ownership and board structure in the business cases
Company
Equity holding 
of the largest 
owner
Equity holdings 
of the largest 
three owners
Board 
size
% of non-
executives on 
the board
% of independent 
directors on the 
board
1 24.77% 41.65% 7 57.14% 14.29%
2 63.72% 69.61% 7 100.00% 28.57%
3 58.07% 99.29% 7 100.00% 28.57%
4 11.07% 24.69% 7 71.43% 71.43%
5 44.26% 44.81% 11 63.63% 27.27%
6 33.70% 47.02% 9 55.55% 22.22%
7 23.02% 64.91% 11 63.63% 18.18%
Mean 36.94% 56.00% 8.43 73.05% 30.08%
Source:  Authors’ survey dataVALUE-BASED MANAGEMENt IN SERBIAN CORPORAtIONS
101
We further analyse the way companies communicate with their shareholders. 
table 3 shows that all the companies, except for company 5, use annual reports 
as the most important or second most important means of communication with 
shareholders, which is consistent with some recommendations for enhancing 
shareholder value (Morin and Jarrell, 2001). Companies also tend to communicate 
with shareholders at Shareholders’ Meetings, described by Strenger (2006) as 
the premier governance instrument for shareholders to directly articulate their 
concerns. Companies rarely use phone, mail, Internet, or dividend payments; 
methods of communication and signals that have become preferred in developed 
economies over the past ten years (Romanek and Lee, 2006). 
Companies traded on the regulated BSE markets offer more publicly available 
information and pay dividends to shareholders on an annual basis. Information 
on companies traded on the unregulated market is often hard to find, and these 
companies do not pay dividends on a regular basis. This is more often the case 
if a company has higher ownership concentration ratio and a lower proportion 
of independent directors on the board. This could be due to stricter criteria 
for listing on the regulated market, and the fact that controlling shareholders 
with larger equity holdings are less interested in shareholder expectations and 
dividend signalling. The implication of this finding is that the corporations in 
Serbia are interested in communication with shareholders only to the degree that 
is required by law or other regulations. This is consistent with studies showing 
that countries with civil law legal systems have strong regulation but weak 
protection of investors, particularly minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000).
We continue our multiple case study by investigating the way companies include 
shareholder expectations in general and additional objective definitions. table 
3 shows that all the companies, except for company 2, believe that shareholders 
expect long-term stability from them, as opposed to four companies (2,3, 4 
and 7), which list short-term profit maximization as their primary objective. 
Furthermore, two (2 and 7) out of four “profit maximization companies” list share 
price increase as the primary shareholder expectation. Share price increase is one 
of the elements of total shareholder return and in line with shareholder value 
maximization. Hence the controversy: this implies that the fact that a company 
recognizes shareholder expectations does not have to mean that the company is 
shareholder value-oriented.102
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The ability of companies 1, 5 and 6 to recognize long-term stability and 
sustainable growth and development and not to highlight profit maximization 
as the primary corporate objective implies that they take care of shareholders’ 
interests. Furthermore, managers in company 1 state that they “make decisions 
consistent with the aim of exceeding the minimal required rate of return of 10%”, 
while managers in company 6 are focused on “obtaining and exceeding the rate 
of return expected by owners.” However, only companies 5 and 6 directly build 
shareholders’ expectations into their primary objective. Company 5 is completely 
dedicated to fulfilling shareholders’ expectations, since it defines its primary 
objective precisely as recognizing shareholders’ expectations – sustainable growth 
and development. Company 6 is the only company in our study that defines its 
primary objective as “sustaining and creating value for owners, business partners 
and employees,” i.e., as creating value for shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Besides company 6, traces of orientation to other stakeholders can be found in the 
objective definitions of companies 5 and 7, while other companies do not mention 
other stakeholders even in secondary objectives. Interestingly, companies 1 and 
6, which are the only companies in our study that pay dividends on an annual 
basis, do not believe that shareholders expect high dividend payments.
table 4 shows that all the companies in our study use traditional accounting and 
market measures of performance. Company 6 uses the largest set of measures, 
and it is the only company in our study where other measures besides traditional 
accounting (net profit and earnings before interest and taxes) or market (dividend 
per share) measures are used. This company uses total shareholder return (tSR) 
and cash flow return on investment (CFROI). None of the companies use economic 
value added (EVA), market value added (MVA), or total business return (tBR). 
Companies tend to rely on traditional capital budgeting techniques (payback 
period and accounting rate of return), but all the companies use at least one 
discounted cash flow investment appraisal technique (net present value, internal 
rate of return, or benefit/cost ratio). In four companies managers use payback 
period as a primary capital budgeting technique, which means that managers in 
these corporations are more interested in capital turnover rate (project liquidity) 
than in profitability. This fact can be explained by the lack of shareholder value 
orientation among companies in our study, as well as by the liquidity problems 
of Serbian corporations and the limited number of funding mechanisms. The 
majority of companies use internal rate of return, which again shows that Serbian 
corporations are concerned with the way each unit of capital is used. 
table 4 shows that the managers of four companies have heard of VBM, while 
two companies implement VBM. Among companies that have never heard of 104
Economic Annals, Volume LVII, No. 193 / April – June 2012
VBM are companies 2, 3, and 4, which define their primary objectives as profit 
maximization. Company 1, which is shareholder value-oriented, has heard 
of VBM but does not implement it. Companies 5 and 6, which are identified 
as the most shareholder value-oriented, are the only companies in our study 
that actually implement VBM. Company 5 implements VBM with the help of 
several institutions and consulting agencies, while the managers of company 6 
state “VBM is in the basis of all the decisions made.” However, our finding and 
conclusions can be challenged by the fact that company 5 uses only accounting 
measures of performance, while company 6 uses payback period as the primary 
capital budgeting technique. Our findings concerning VBM application and 
performance measures are not very different from findings of some other studies 
(Bouwens and Van Lent (2007); Marr, 2004; Ryan and trahan, 1999).
We now turn to investigating the influence of the corporate governance 
characteristics of companies in our study on shareholder value orientation, 
objective definition, and performance measures used. Companies 2 and 3, 
which have the largest dominant owners, define their primary objective as 
profit maximization, which is certainly an acceptable objective for a dominant 
shareholder, but is not an acceptable objective for minority shareholders and 
other stakeholders. These two companies use only accounting earnings and ROA 
as performance measures, and have never heard of VBM. On the other hand, 
the three companies (1, 5 and 6) that were identified as the most shareholder 
value-oriented, and the two companies (5 and 6) implementing VBM, belong 
to the group of companies with lower ownership concentration (1, 4, 5, and 6), 
measured by the equity holdings of the largest three owners.VALUE-BASED MANAGEMENt IN SERBIAN CORPORAtIONS
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In regard to the influence of the board structure as a second important variable 
of corporate governance, it seems that the percentage of non-executive and 
independent directors does not play a role in corporate shareholder value 
orientation, implementation of VBM, performance measurement, and capital 
budgeting techniques choice. Company 2 with 100% of non-executive directors 
is the only one that does not list long-term stability as the shareholders’ 
expectation, has never heard of VBM, and quotes profit maximization as its 
primary objective. Similarly, company 3, whose board also consists entirely of 
non-executive directors, uses only accounting earnings and return on assets 
(ROA) as performance measures and payback period as its primary capital 
budgeting technique, states profit maximization as its primary objective, and has 
never heard of VBM. Company 4 is in the same situation, which is the company 
with the highest proportion of independent directors on the board. In contrast, 
companies that are value oriented (1 and 6) have the lowest percentages of non-
executive and independent directors. The implications of our findings concerning 
corporate governance are that ownership concentration is the major governance 
mechanism of Serbian corporations, and that the structure of the boards of 
directors is a weak governance variable (mechanism) in Serbian corporations.
Based on research findings, we identify several factors influencing corporate 
culture, corporate objectives, and choice of performance measures of large 
publicly traded companies in Serbia. These are:
1) Civil law legal system - Serbia is a civil law country with weak de jure and de 
facto shareholder protection. Consequently, companies have a high degree 
of ownership concentration and tend to take shareholder interests and 
requirements into consideration only to the degree that is required by law and 
other regulations. 
2) Belgrade stock exchange (BSE) rules - Companies traded on the regulated (Prime 
and Standard) BSE markets communicate better with their shareholders. The 
reason is stricter rules for listing the shares on regulated than on unregulated 
markets. 
3) Funding mechanisms - Along with characteristics of the legal system, BSE does 
not provide incentives for using IPO as a funding mechanism for corporations. 
Therefore, corporations do not feel pressure from the capital market and 
shareholders to create high shareholder returns, pay dividends, and regularly 
inform shareholders. 
4) Uninformed managers – Managers of three of the surveyed corporations have 
never heard of value-based management, while managers of another three 
corporations heard about this concept thanks to Serbian scientific sources. VALUE-BASED MANAGEMENt IN SERBIAN CORPORAtIONS
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That is, scientific and professional papers are available in the Serbian language, 
and several institutions (or agencies) provide consulting services in the area 
of value based management, but still many managers have not heard anything 
about value-based methodologies and value measures of performance.
Bearing in mind key factors determining the relations between corporations and 
shareholders in Serbia, we identify two important preconditions for improving 
these relations. The first precondition is improvement of the legal framework. The 
New Law on the Capital Market (Official Gazette RS, No. 31/2011) relies on a new 
market development strategy advocating an upgrade of the stature of the BSE 
by removing from admission to trading those companies in which there is no 
significant trading interest. It provides better protection of shareholders’ rights 
and provides for the establishment of an Investor Protection Fund. The law also 
regulates public offerings, which could motivate corporations in Serbia to use this 
funding mechanism. Also, the new Law on Companies (RS Official Gazette, No. 
36/2011), although not substantially different from its previous version, provides 
more detailed and precise provisions and allows corporations to choose between a 
one-tier and a two-tier board, which is in accordance with EU regulations. These 
two laws should provide a better legal framework for the operation of Serbian 
corporations, better protection of investors, and better communication between 
corporations and their shareholders. 
The second precondition is development of the BSE and strengthening of the 
Securities Commission by providing adequate supervision and enforcement. 
Along with a better legal framework that clearly defines the supervisory role of 
the Securities Commission by directing its focus on those regulatory activities 
that are the most important in achieving investor protection and fair and orderly 
trading of securities, this precondition should provide efficient functioning of the 
market and attract more individuals and foreign investors to the BSE. We believe 
that these two preconditions, as well as institutional investors and foreign direct 
investment, are going to significantly determine the direction and degree of the 
development of corporate governance and performance measures in Serbian 
corporations.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Value-based management places the need for an integrated approach to company 
management at the forefront, which includes the definition, implementation, and 
evaluation of strategic and operational decisions with respect to the objective 108
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of shareholder value maximization. The performance measures developed 
in the context of value-based management are an important factor of value-
based management implementation and business improvements. However, too 
much focus on performance measurement can cause serious problems in VBM 
implementation, as reported in several studies. Companies must also rely on 
governance mechanisms and comprehensive management processes in order to 
meet different information requirements and improve business performance. 
The ownership concentration in Serbian corporations is very high, while 
the proportion of independent directors on the board is small if compared to 
statistics reported from samples of non-financial firms in developed countries. 
In other words, dominant shareholders tend to appoint weak boards, which can 
lead to serious conflicts between dominant and minority shareholders. In the 
absence of strong boards, policy makers in Serbia should develop better legal 
and institutional mechanisms for protecting minority shareholders. Companies 
traded on the regulated markets of the Belgrade Stock Exchange have a lower 
ownership concentration ratio, tend to have smaller boards of directors and a 
lower proportion of independent directors on the board, and are more likely to 
take expected rate of return into consideration.
Corporations in Serbia are interested in communicating with shareholders only 
to the degree that is required by law or other regulations. Companies that are not 
traded on the regulated markets of the Belgrade Stock Exchange have a higher 
ownership concentration ratio and a lower proportion of independent directors 
on the board, offer less publicly available information, and do not pay dividends 
on a regular basis.
Corporations usually believe that shareholders expect long-term stability, 
growth, and development, as well as market share increase, but only three of 
them are really shareholder value-oriented. This means that, although a company 
can recognize shareholder expectations, it is not consequently oriented towards 
shareholder value maximization. 
All the surveyed companies use traditional accounting and market measures 
of performance, while none of the companies use EVA, MVA, or tBR. Only 
one company in our study uses total shareholder return (tSR) and cash flow 
return on investment (CFROI). Companies tend to rely on traditional capital 
budgeting techniques, but all the companies use at least one discounted cash 
flow investment appraisal technique. As for value-based management, we find 
that the three most shareholder value-oriented companies have heard of VBM, VALUE-BASED MANAGEMENt IN SERBIAN CORPORAtIONS
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and two of them are actually implementing VBM. The implications of our 
findings concerning the relation between corporate governance and VBM are 
that ownership concentration is the major governance mechanism of Serbian 
corporations, and that boards of directors are the weak governance mechanism 
in Serbian corporations.
Based on research findings, we identify four factors influencing corporate 
governance, corporate objectives, and choice of performance measures of 
large publicly traded companies in Serbia. These are the civil law legal system, 
the Belgrade Stock Exchange market on which company’s shares are traded, 
limited funding mechanisms, and uninformed managers. Bearing in mind 
these factors, we identify two important preconditions for improving relations 
between corporations and shareholders and the ability of corporations to create 
shareholder value: 1) improving the legal framework, and 2) the development of 
the Belgrade Stock Exchange and strengthening of the Securities Commission. 
We emphasize external factors and preconditions for improving relations 
between corporations and shareholders because the characteristics of Serbian 
culture (see Janićijević, 2003) and the legal system foreground external incentives 
to managers’ and investors’ actions, and not internal or individual initiatives. 
Our research has several limitations, one of which is the small number of 
corporations that are investigated. However, we believe that it gives a useful 
insight into the corporate culture, corporate governance, and performance 
measures used in large publicly traded companies from different industry sectors 
in Serbia. This insight provides a basis for understanding the factors influencing 
the corporate governance and performance measurement systems of Serbian 
corporations, and for the future theoretical and empirical investigation of this 
problem. Future research should focus on investigating the particular business 
areas in which VBM is used and factors that limit or motivate the use of specific 
governance mechanisms or performance measures. 
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